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Note
“You’re Not Actually Going into an Asteroid Field?”—The
Threat of Man-Made Space Debris, and a Proposal to
Extend Existing Law to Prevent it
Justin Moor
“I hate space.”1
I. Introduction
Directed by Alfonso Cuarón, Gravity is the highest-grossing movie
ever released in the months of September or October.2 The plot’s catalyst
is a Russian missile strike on an old satellite, which creates a large cloud
of debris that travels at a deadly speed.3 The debris cloud destroys an
American space shuttle and satellite, killing much of the crew.4 The two
surviving astronauts, played by Sandra Bullock and George Clooney, are
left to find their way back to Earth.5 This may seem like a scenario firmly
planted in the realm of science-fiction, but the threat of orbiting debris to
spacecraft and satellites is very real.6 The National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) estimates that there are hundreds of
millions of pieces of man-made debris in orbit, and “even the smallest of
these items has the ability to put future launches. . . or one of the 1,000 or
so operational satellites in orbit at risk.”7 Satellites fulfill a number of
needs, including communications, navigation, data transmission,
surveillance, weather forecasting, and more. Any threat to these
spacecraft must be taken seriously.
The debris problem is worsening, as debris-caused collisions
produce yet more debris and increase the chance of future collisions.8
Currently, no effective international framework is in place to prevent the
spread of debris. Unfortunately, removal of orbital debris is at the
moment technologically impossible.9 To confront this threat to national
and commercial interests, the international community must thus focus
 JD expected, 2015 University of Minnesota Law School.
1. GRAVITY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013).
2. Ray Subers, ‘Gravity’ Dominates Disappointing October, BOXOFFICEMOJO.COM
(Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.boxofficemojo.com/news/?id=3746&p=.htm. The movie is
still in theaters as of this writing.
3. Robyn Johnston, The Space Junk Disaster in ‘Gravity’ is a Real Threat,
BUSINESSINSIDER.COM (Oct. 28, 2013, 12:49 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/thespace-junk-disaster-in-gravity-is-a-real-threat-to-earth-2013-10.
4. GRAVITY (Warner Bros. Pictures 2013).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. MATTHEW J. KLEIMAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF SPACE LAW at 82–83 (2013).
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squarely on debris prevention. This Note argues that, until debris removal
becomes possible, a relatively simple extension of the Convention on
International Liability is a significant step toward solving the problem.
Part II of this article gives an overview of modern space law, a
description of space debris and why it is a problem, and what measures
the international community is currently taking to address the issue. Part
III explains why these efforts have fallen short, and suggests a simple
amendment to the Convention on International Liability to discourage
debris-creating behavior.
II. Background
The Law of Space
On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched a modified
intercontinental ballistic missile into space called Sputnik.10 Sputnik in
Russian means ‘travelling companion.’11 It contained no cameras,
sophisticated computing equipment, solar panels, or method of
propulsion after reaching orbit.12 Sputnik’s main and only function was
to transmit a radio signal providing pressure and temperature readings, as
well as the reassurance that the satellite had not yet been hit by a
meteorite, natural space debris.13 Despite it being a global event, the
legality of Sputnik’s launch was questionable. International air law could
not govern Sputnik. If it did, Sputnik would be illegally infringing on
multiple foreign states’ air space by orbiting over them.14
To resolve this, the United Nations in 1958 formed the Committee
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS).15 Now a permanent
body with seventy-six members,16 COPUOS has drafted most of the
major international space-law treaties. This subsection will summarize
the three agreements most pertinent to space debris: the Outer Space
Treaty, the Convention on International Liability, and the Convention on
Registration.
The Outer Space Treaty of 1967
The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies (“Outer Space Treaty”), is the first and, arguably the
most significant space law document.17 As of January 1, 2013, one
hundred and two states (including North Korea) are party to the Outer
Space Treaty. Twenty-six more have signed the treaty but not ratified it.18
10. Ron Cowen, Sputnik + 50: Remembering the Dawn of the Space Age, 172 SCI.
NEWS 216, 218 (2007).
11. Id. at 216.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Kleiman, supra note 7, at ix.
15. History and Overview of Activities, U.N. OFF. FOR OUTER SPACE AFF.,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/COPUOS/cop_overview.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2013).
16. Id.
17. Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A Critical Look at the Current
Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 345, 349
(1995).
18. Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Legal Subcomm, Rep. on its 52nd

The Treaty states that outer space “shall be free for exploration and
use by all States,”19 and cannot be conquered as it “is not subject to
national appropriation by claim of sovereignty.”20 More recent articles
have forbidden the use or placement of weapons of mass destruction in
space.21 Articles 6, 7, and 9 are most important with regard to space
debris. These hold, respectively, that states are responsible for their own
activities in space, even if conducted by private parties; that states are
liable for damage caused by objects launched into space from within their
territory; and that states have an obligation to avoid ‘harmful
contamination’ of outer space and celestial bodies.22
Key terms, including “harmful contamination” and “space object,”23
are not defined, causing enforcement issues with the treaty.24 This will be
discussed later in this Note. Nevertheless, the Outer Space Treaty
remains the most significant source of law for operations above (or at the
outer reaches of) the Earth’s atmosphere.
The Liability Convention of 1972
The Convention on International Liability and Damage Caused by
Space Objects (the “Liability Convention”) took effect in 1973, and
expands on Article 7 of the Outer Space Treaty.25 As of October 2010,
ninety states have adopted and twenty-three more have signed the
Liability Convention.26 According to the Convention’s terms, launching
countries are strictly liable for damage occurring on the ground or to
aircraft.27 Countries that cooperate in the launch of a space object may be
jointly liable.28 There is a one-year statute of limitations on damages
claims, which begins after “the occurrence of the damage or the
identification of the launching State which is liable.”29
Article 3 could be a source of space debris regulation. For damage
caused in space by another state’s space object, liability falls on the
launching state “only if the damage is due to its fault or the fault of

Sess., Apr. 18–19, 2013, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2013/CRP.5 (Mar. 28 2013).
19. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. 1, Jan. 27, 1967,
18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
20. Id. at art. 2.
21. Id. at art. 4.
22. Id. at art. 6–7, 9 (“States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space,
including the moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to
avoid their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the
Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter.”).
23. Joseph S. Imburgia, Space Debris and its Threat to National Security: A
Proposal for a Binding International Agreement to Clean Up the Junk, 44 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 589, 614–615 (2011).
24. For instance, legal scholars continue to disagree on whether or not debris
constitutes a ‘space object.’ See id.; see also infra, pp. 23–25.
25. See Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762, 961 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Liability
Convention].
26. Imburgia, supra note 23, at 616.
27. Liability Convention, supra note 25, at art. 2.
28. Id. at art. 5.
29. Id. at art. 10.

persons for whom it is responsible.”30 While “space object” is defined in
the treaty,31 the term “fault” is not.32 Because the treaty does not define
fault, the international community has generally interpreted ‘fault’ as
“legal fault in the sense that the responsible party acted negligently by
violating an established duty of care.”33 This definition creates significant
problems when attempting to enforce the treaty.34
The Convention does have a defined procedure for resolving these
disputes. First, “[a] claim for compensation for damage shall be
presented to a launching State through diplomatic channels.”35 If this is
not possible, the harmed state “may also present its claim through the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.”36 In the event that parties are
unable to settle, they must appoint a Claims Commission to resolve the
dispute.37 This Commission is comprised of three members: one
nominated by each country, plus one member chosen jointly by both
countries.38 However, the decision of the Claims Committee is not
binding, unless both parties agree that it is, and no state ever created a
Claims Commission.39
The Convention on Registration of 1975
The Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer
Space,40 or ‘Registration Convention,’ is potentially useful in deterring
debris-creating behavior. It requires any state launching a space object to
keep a detailed registry of that object, including an identifying
registration number, when and from where the object was launched, the
object’s general purpose, and basic information about the object’s orbit.41
States must give this information to the United Nations (U.N.) “as soon
as practicable.”42 The U.N. then enters this information into a publiclyaccessible registry.43
The convention permits, but does not require, states to update the
30. Id. at art. 3.
31. “The term ‘space object’ includes component parts of a space object as well as its
launch vehicle and parts thereof.” Id at art. 1.
32. Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 59, 59 (1999).
33. Kleiman, supra note 9, at 74.
34. See infra pp. 25–26.
35. Liability Convention, supra note 25, at art. 9.
36. Id.
37. Id. at art. 14.
38. Id. at art. 15.
39. Lauren Bressack, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Pollution: Defining a
Standard of Care to Hold Polluters Accountable, 43 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 741, 759–
760 (2011). This may be because a Claims Committee’s decision is not automatically
binding. It may also be because Claims Committees have no specific delegated powers
other than the ability to make a final judgment, and thus may not be able to adequately
acquire or analyze evidence. See Liability Convention, supra note 22, at art. 15–20. Note
also that only one case has been resolved under the liability convention, and that case
ended in settlement. Id. at 760 n.128.
40. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14 1975,
28 U.S.T. 695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (hereinafter “Registration Convention”).
41. See id.
42. Id. at art. 4.
43. Id.

information in this registry.44 If a space object breaks apart into debris,
the launching state has no duty to tell the U.N. Countries often do not
even report launches. Between 2001 and 2003, states registered only
seventy five percent of all launches at both the national and international
level.45 Thus, the Registration Convention is far from a bastion of
enforcement and adherence that can help deter debris creation.
Space Debris since Sputnik: Where Debris Comes From, and
Why it Poses a Threat
Since Sputnik in 1957, nearly every spacecraft has created some sort
of debris, be it small pieces that break away from the main craft, or
whole components such as used rockets or fuel tanks.46 Even paint chips
can be a potential hazard.47 While functional spacecraft have evasive
maneuver capabilities to avoid collisions with debris,48 inert debris
cannot avoid collisions with other debris. This results in debris-on-debris
collisions that result in a substantially increased amount of debris, each
piece of debris smaller than before but still potentially dangerous.49 The
frequency of these ‘fragmentation events’ has increased over the last
half-century.50 Experts estimate that there are currently over “500,000
man-made objects larger than a centimeter, and millions of objects
smaller than a centimeter” in orbit around Earth.51 Only about 1,000 of
those objects larger than a centimeter are functional spacecraft.52
The Fragmentation Events of 2007 and 2009
Two events in the past six years substantially increased the amount
of debris in orbit. The first was a Chinese anti-satellite missile test
conducted in 2007.53 The Chinese government chose a defunct, onemetric-ton weather satellite as their target.54 Upon striking the satellite,
the missile obliterated it.55 This test was the largest fragmentation event
on record, resulting in over 150,000 pieces of debris larger than one
44. Id. Note, though, that states do have to inform the U.N. once their space objects
leave orbit.
45. Imburgia, supra note 23, at 618 n.243.
46. See Jordan Olliges, The Impact of Orbital Debris, ILLLUMIN (Sept. 9, 2013),
http://illumin.usc.edu/printer/16/the-impact-of-orbital-debris/.
47. Lawrence D. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris:
Combining International Regulatory and Liability Regimes, 15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 51, 55 (1992) [hereinafter Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris]
(highlighting an example of the hazards of space debris).
48. See Kadhim Shubber, US Budget Cuts Force Debris-Tracking Space Fence
Offline, WIRED (Aug. 14, 2013), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/2013-08/14/spacefence-shutdown.
49. See generally Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris, supra
note 43.
50. Olliges, supra note 46.
51. Kleiman, supra note 9, at 71.
52. Id. at 71.
53. See
T.S.
Kelso,
Chinese
ASAT
Test,
CELESTRAK,
http://celestrak.com/events/asat.asp (last updated Sept. 25, 2013).
54. Nat’l Aeronautics & Space Admin., Fengyun 1-C Debris: One Year Later,
ORBITAL
DEBRIS
Q.
NEWS
(Jan.
2008),
available
at
http://orbitaldebris.jsc.nasa.gov/newsletter/pdfs/ODQNv12i1.pdf [hereinafter NASA].
55. Id.

centimeter.56 Scientists estimate that 80% of this debris will still be in
orbit in 2107.57 This single incident makes China responsible for almost
half of all tracked satellite breakup debris.58
The second recent fragmentation event occurred when a defunct
Russian satellite collided with an active U.S. commercial satellite.59 This
was the worst accidental collision on record, producing thousands more
pieces of debris.60 The U.S. commercial satellite belonged to a private
telephone company called Iridium, and not the U.S. government.61 The
collision caused only a small interruption in Iridium’s phone service.62
However, since the satellite was launched from the United States, the
Liability Convention implies that the U.S. government may be liable for
damage caused by its debris.63
The Physics and Orbital Dynamics of Space Debris
Objects in orbit around the Earth travel very, very quickly, and
space debris is no exception. Orbital velocities of debris range from
11,000 to 35,000 kilometers per hour,64 up to twenty-eight times the
speed of sound. A piece of debris weighing only two grams and traveling
35,000 kilometers per hour could hit a spacecraft with the force of one
thousand tons of TNT.65
While larger pieces of debris strike with greater force, even nearmicroscopic debris can pose a serious threat.66 Tiny chunks of debris—
such as paint chips—can, and have, caused damage to spacecraft.67 In
fact, a one-centimeter piece of debris could be enough to penetrate the

56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Kelso, supra note 50.
NASA, supra note 49. Note that only a small portion of total debris is tracked.
See Veronika Oleksyn, What a Mess! Experts Ponder Space Junk Problem, USA
TODAY, (Feb. 19, 2009), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2009-02-19space-junk_n.htm.
60. Traci Watson, Two Satellites Collide 500 Miles over Siberia, USA TODAY, (Feb.
12,
2009),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/science/space/2009-02-11satellites_N.htm.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. See infra notes 146–156 and accompanying text.
64. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris, supra note 47, at 55.
Speed depends heavily on how close the object’s orbit is to the Earth.
65. See generally Lucinda R. Roberts, Orbital Debris: Another Pollution Problem
for the International Community, 11 FL. J. INT’L L. 613, 615–16 (1997). The damage such
a collision would cause depends on several factors, the first being the relative velocities of
the debris and the spacecraft. If the craft is moving in the opposite direction of the debris,
the force on impact could double, analogous to a head-on automobile collision. Damage
inflicted will also vary with the angle of impact and how close the impact site is to the
spacecraft’s center of mass. See Meghan R. Plantz, Orbital Debris: Out of Space, 40 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 585, 595 (2012).
66. See supra note 47 and infra note 67 and accompanying text.
67. See Robert C. Bird, Procedural Challenges to Environmental Regulation of
Space Debris, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 635, 640 (2003) (noting that in 1983, a 0.2 mm paint chip
stuck a window of the space shuttle Challenger, causing $50,000 in damage and requiring
a replacement window).

International Space Station and kill its crew.68 Debris of this size cannot
be effectively detected or avoided.69 Large numbers of small collisions
can cause damage or corrosion, which can wear down important
observational equipment,70 or even render spacecraft inoperable.
According to several NASA scientists, the number of pieces of
debris will continue to increase even without any additional spacecraft
being launched:
Even without new launches, collisions will continue to occur in the
LEO [low-Earth orbit] environment over the next 200 years, primarily
driven by the high collision activities in the region between 900-and
1000-km altitudes, and will force the debris population to increase. In
reality, the situation will undoubtedly be far worse because spacecraft
and their orbital stages will continue to be launched.71
This prediction came in 2006, before the Chinese missile test and
the Russo-U.S. satellite collision. Those events have accelerated the
debris-propagation process. Further compounding the problem, debris
tends to remain in orbit for many years (depending on what level of orbit
it originated in) before its orbit decays and it begins an atmospheric
descent or drifts into outer space.72 Based on the present level of debris,
some estimate that it would take anywhere from one to ten million years
for space in Earth’s orbit to clear entirely.73
Lastly, it is worth noting that collisions and discarded parts are not
the only sources of debris. Satellites at the end of their life cycle are often
simply left in crowded orbits.74 These crafts “cannot realistically carry
enough extra propellant to move into an atmospheric disposal orbit at the
end of their useful lives.”75 Crafts may be able to move themselves into a
less-populated orbit,76 decreasing the chance that they will collide with
any active craft or break up into debris. Nevertheless, evidence shows
that most satellite operators simply do not do this.77 The European Union
found that in 2009, only 11 of 21 satellites at the end of their lifespan
were actually relocated to a higher, less-popular orbit.78 As discussed
below, this happens despite non-binding international guidelines that
68. Id. at 641.
69. Plantz, supra note 65, at 596.
70. Roberts, Addressing the Problem of Orbital Space Debris, supra note 47, at 55–
56.
71. J.C. Liou & N.L. Johnson, Risk in Space from Orbiting Debris, 311 SCIENCE
340, 340 (2006).
72. See infra note 73 and accompanying text.
73. Mary Button, Cleaning up Space: The Madrid Protocol to the Antarctic Treaty
as a Model for Regulating Orbital Debris, 37 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV.
539, 547 (2013).
74. Kleiman, supra note 9, at 81–82.
75. Id. at 82. Atmospheric disposal orbit is defined as an orbit that would cause the
spacecraft to harmlessly break up in the atmosphere. Id.
76. Id. at 82.
77. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
78. See R. Choc and R. Jehn, Classification of Geosynchronous Objects, 12 EUR.
SPACE AGENCY (2010) available at http://lfvn.astronomer.ru/files/COGO-issue12.pdf.

require satellite removal.79 Whether by collision-caused fragmentation,
abandonment of defunct spacecraft in orbit, or just paint chipping off of
satellites, the amount of space debris in orbit is rapidly increasing, and it
will all stay in orbit for potentially a million years or more.80
Space in Earth’s Orbit is Limited
Outer space is vast, perhaps infinitely large; however the space
around Earth in which satellites can actually be useful is finite.81 Orbital
paths around the Earth are primarily differentiated by their speed and
distance from the Earth’s surface,82 so satellites are placed in different
orbits depending on their purpose. A satellite designed for taking highresolution photographs requires a comparatively low orbit, whereas a
higher orbit will better serve a telecommunications satellite in order to
draw line of sight to more of the Earth’s surface.83 There are three
commonly used orbital paths.84 They are known as low-Earth orbit
(LEO), medium-Earth orbit (MEO), and geosynchronous Earth orbit
(GEO).85
GEO requires a brief explanation. While in GEO, a spacecraft orbits
Earth at the same speed Earth turns.86 Spacecraft in GEO thus remain
above a fixed point on the Earth’s surface. This feature, combined with
the height of the orbit, makes it useful for telecommunications
satellites.87 Space within this orbit is limited, because satellites must
maintain a precise distance (22,236 miles) from the Earth’s surface.88
Though half of all active satellites are in LEO,89 GEO is the most
regulated, and comes under the purview of the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), a 193-member U.N. agency.90 The
ITU’s process is complicated, but essentially they assign discrete orbital
‘slots’ to ITU member states who apply for them, and those states cannot
launch more spacecraft once their ‘slots’ are used up.91 The regulatory
details show that orbital space is finite, and that there has been some
regulatory success at limiting the number of active spacecraft in orbit.92

79. See infra notes 122–125, 129–136 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 64–75 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 82–88 and accompanying text.
82. Kleiman, supra note 9, at 51.
83. Id.
84. See infra note 85 and accompanying text.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Kleiman, supra note 9, at 51.
Id. at 53.
Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id.

91. See id. at 61–62.
92. See supra notes 86–91 and accompanying text.

The Impact of Space Debris: The Kessler Syndrome and other
Less-Severe Predictions
Access to Earth’s orbit is important for a variety of reasons. Satellite
telecommunications companies comprise a $180 billion-dollar-per-year
global industry,93 and therefore damage to satellites could have major
economic consequences. Apart from the loss of corporate revenues,
losing telecom satellites harms the people who rely on them both in their
career and in their lives. The 2009 satellite collision provides a good
example of an incident that could have had far harsher consequences.
Iridium, the company whose satellite was destroyed, provided phone
service to workers on offshore oil platforms.94 Those workers rely on
satellites to communicate with the outside world. The 2009 collision
temporarily interrupted phone service, but a series of such collisions
could have resulted in longer communication failures with the outside
world.95 If the rate of collisions increases, people in similarly isolated
areas could see their communications equipment malfunction as well.
Data transmission via the internet could also be harmed. Even people in
densely populated areas might have to resort to slower, shorter-ranged
methods of communication.
Many developed states, the U.S. in particular, depend on satellites
for national security.96 Satellites are vital to modern military intelligencegathering and navigation. Satellite-powered GPS guidance is vital to
ensuring that guided missiles and bombs hit their targets.97 In a 2006
hearing, members of Congress addressed the issue of satellites and
national security:
Lieutenant General C. Robert Kehler, then the Deputy Commander,
United States Strategic Command, stated that “space capabilities are
inextricably woven into the fabric of American security.” He added that
these space capabilities are “vital to our daily efforts throughout the
world in all aspects of modern warfare” and discussed how integral space
capabilities are to “defeating terrorist threats, defending the homeland in
depth, shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads and
preventing hostile states and actors from acquiring or using WMD.”98
The U.S. and the international community at large have a vested
interest in keeping debris from crowding satellites out of orbit. Scholars
have provided several scenarios that detail the gravity of the situation,
and how conditions may develop if present policies remain in place.99
The Kessler Syndrome: The Worst-Case Scenario
93. Kleiman, supra note 9, at 60.
94. Watson, supra note 60.
95. See supra notes 59–61 and accompanying text.
96. See Imburgia, supra note 23, at 608–12.
97. See generally id.
98. Id. at 609–10 (quoting Space and U.S. Nat'l Power: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Strategic Forces of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 109th Cong. (2006)
(statement of Lt. Gen. C. Robert Kehler, Deputy Commander, U.S. Strategic Command))
(footnotes omitted).
99. See infra notes 100–112100 and accompanying text.

The Cascade Effect, more popularly known as the Kessler
Syndrome, comes from a 1978 paper by NASA scientist Donald
Kessler.100 The basic hypothesis is that, initially, most of the debris in
orbit will be made up of larger objects.101 Those objects will collide,
producing more and more fragmentation, which in turn makes
subsequent collisions more likely.102 Since debris stays in orbit for over a
million years there will be exponential growth in the amount of orbital
debris, as more collisions create more debris, which in turn creates more
collisions.103 This could “eventually produce an impenetrable cloud of
fragmentation debris that will encase Earth,” making space travel nearly
impossible.104
In a 2010 paper, Kessler and several NASA scientists revisited these
predictions using more advanced mathematical models. They concluded
that the Cascade Effect is still a substantial threat to spacecraft in orbit,
even with no additional spacecraft launches.105 Their models suggest that,
over the next fifty years, the number of major collisions could triple that
of the last fifty years, with further increases still possible.106 The
timeframe for the gradual increase in space collisions is very uncertain,
with some predictions holding that the collision cascade could begin as
soon as in a decade.107 Therefore, actions must be taken now in order to
mitigate the risk of a collision cascade and its consequences.
Other Predictions are Less Severe, but Still Dire
The Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC),
an organization comprised of members of government space agencies
from around the globe, recently published a summary of multiple
predictive models for debris growth.108 Using optimistic assumptions,109
six different governmental agencies (including NASA, the European
Space Agency, and the United Kingdom Space Agency) submitted
predictive models.110 All models returned similar results, and generally
predicted a thirty percent increase in the debris population over the next
100. Donald J. Kessler et al., The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space
Operations, 33d Annual AAs Guidance and Control Conference, Paper AAS 10-016, at 1
(Feb. 2010), available at http://webpages.charter.net/dkessler/files/Kessler%20SyndromeAAS%20Paper.pdf.
101. See id. at 2 (“[T]he two objects will eventually collide and break up into a
number of smaller fragments.”).
102. See id. at 2–8 (creating a model for calculating the rate of collision and
explaining the consequences of collisions).
103. See generally id. at 2 (explaining the concept of collisional cascading effect).
104. Mark J. Sundahl, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case For a Market-Share
Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 132 (2000).
105. Kessler, supra note 100, at 6.
106. Id. at 6.
107. Imburgia, supra note 23, at 598.
108. J.C. Liou et al., Stability of the Future LEO Environment, IADC–12–08 INTERAGENCY SPACE DEBRIS COORDINATION COMMITTEE 1 (2013), available at
http://www.iadc-online.org/Documents/IADC-201208,%20Rev%201,%20Stability%20of%20Future%20LEO%20Environment.pdf.
109. For instance, all models assumed a 90% compliance rate with guidelines for
removing defunct satellites from orbit. Id. at 2. Of course, the actual compliance rate with
those procedures is more like 50%. See Choc, supra note 78, at 126.
110. Liou et al., supra note 108, at 2.

two hundred years, with catastrophic (spacecraft-disabling) collisions
occurring every five to nine years.111 These models made unrealistic
assumptions about compliance with debris-mitigation guidelines. The
study itself concluded that “-[t]he 90%-compliance assumption made in
the simulations is certainly higher than the current reality. If the
international community cannot reach this level soon, future debris
population growth will be far worse than the AI 27.1 study results.”112
Without urgent action, even conservative models predict dire
consequences for spacecraft in orbit.
Current Efforts to Mitigate Space Debris
In general, there are three types of programs currently underway to
prevent the impact of space debris. Those programs are debris tracking,
debris prevention, and debris removal.
Debris Tracking
Debris tracking focuses on monitoring the location of debris so as to
avoid collisions with active spacecraft. The U.S. maintains the most
effective debris-tracking program in the world. The U.S. program is
capable of tracking objects five centimeters in diameter and larger in
LEO, and objects one meter in diameter or larger in GEO.113 The U.S.
makes most of this data publicly available, so corporations or other states
can also use it to avoid collisions.114 The European Union (EU) is putting
together a space-monitoring program of its own. Several private
organizations have also agreed to share debris-tracking data to preserve
their satellites.115 These orbital monitoring programs are helpful, but far
from perfect.
First, recent budget cuts have forced the U.S. to shut down
important parts of its monitoring network. Most significant was the
shutdown of the Air Force Space Surveillance System, known as the
‘space fence,’ which was recently deactivated to save fourteen million
dollars per year.116 Unlike other radar systems, which must be tasked to
look at specific areas of space, the space fence could simultaneously
track debris over several extremely large areas.117 It was considered a
“key part”118 of the U.S. surveillance program, important for general
awareness of the debris environment in Earth orbit. The fence was shut
down on September 1, 2013.119 The extent of damage to U.S. efforts to
detect and avoid debris caused by the shutdown is unclear.
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The second problem is that current surveillance cannot detect most
debris. The U.S. system currently tracks twenty two thousand pieces of
debris.120 Yet, scientists estimate that there are over five hundred
thousand pieces of debris larger than a centimeter in orbit.121 Since even
small pieces of debris can inflict severe damage on spacecraft, it is clear
that current monitoring systems are helpful, but nowhere near effective
enough to make orbit entirely safe.
Debris Mitigation
There exist both domestic and international ‘codes of conduct’
aimed at preventing additional space debris. The U.S. was the first
country to issue such domestic guidelines.122 The Orbital Debris
Mitigation Standard Practices outline a number of goals, including
selecting safe flight profiles, and safely disposing of defunct
spacecraft.123 Since the U.S. created these regulations in the late 1990s,
other countries, including the EU and Russia, have adopted similar
regulations.124 These regulations have helped curb debris-related
damages. However, since any state’s space operations indirectly affect
those of all other states, an international regime is necessary to regulate
space effectively.125 Differing domestic regulations complicate dispute
resolution, and make it difficult to answer several questions. Could states
be liable for debris-related damages if they violated the victim state’s
regulations? Or would they only be liable for breaking their own
regulations? What administrative bodies would have jurisdiction over
these disputes? Furthermore, individual states cannot solve the problem
on their own—all spacefaring countries need to regulate their
behavior.126
International mitigation guidelines do exist, and they mostly
originate from the IADC. The IADC implemented its own guidelines in
2002.127 These same guidelines, with very minor alterations, were
adopted by the full U.N. General Assembly in 2007.128 These guidelines
set out seven generic recommendations which are non-binding, such as
“limit the probability of accidental collision in orbit” and “avoid
international destruction and other harmful activities.”129 Evidence
indicates that compliance with these recommendations is quite
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infrequent.130
Debris Removal
Effective debris removal is not possible with current technology.131
Large pieces of debris, such as defunct satellites, could be removed
individually by a revival of the Space Shuttle program, or the Russian
Soyuz.132 However, such an endeavor would be both time-consuming and
costly. Debris smaller than five inches in diameter is undetectable to the
U.S. space-monitoring network, and thus impossible to remove in any
organized manner. Even if these fragments were detectable, with the
sheer number of them, removal would require a massive expansion of
international space operations. Other proposals, such as building
“ground-based ‘laser brooms’ to sweep debris from orbit,”133 are even
less feasible. Until technology improves, the world cannot fix its past
mistakes—it can only avoid making them again.
III. Analysis
Current Law Fails to Prevent Debris Buildup and Avert
Collisions
Given the current impossibility of debris removal, debris mitigation
and detection are the only ways to preserve Earth’s orbit for future use.
Current debris mitigation and monitoring programs are well-intentioned,
but ultimately ineffective.
Most Debris Mitigation Standards are Non-Binding
The debris-mitigation standards adopted by the U.N. are useful, and
could well work if they were enforceable. The IADC estimates that, with
a ninety percent compliance rate with these mitigation guidelines, the
orbital debris population will grow by only about thirty percent over the
next two hundred years.134 This is not ideal, but such measures would
allow for continued space operations, and would partially stave off what
the Kessler Syndrome predicts. But the U.N. standards are guidelines, not
rules.
Even states that openly approve of these guidelines do not always
follow them. In 2009, Russia left three defunct satellites to drift in GEO,
and in 2008, the U.S. and Russia each left one satellite in GEO.135 Even
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if these satellites never collide with other space objects, they take up
valuable GEO ‘slots.’ This data also shows that the U.S. often fails to
follow its own regulations, which require responsible disposal of
satellites. Globally, only one in three satellites in GEO is put into a
graveyard orbit.136 If the U.S. often fails to comply with the U.N.
guidelines, imagine what compliance rates will be like for countries that
are more cavalier in their approach to space operations, such as China,
the state that deliberately destroyed a satellite in orbit.
Non-mandatory provisions such as these could “become binding
customary law through repeated practice over time,”137 but this is
unlikely in a world where states do not actually follow them. The EU in
2008 proposed a binding code of conduct, which would, among other
things, require states to do two things. First, it would require states to not
intentionally destroy orbital objects. Second, it would require states to
implement policies to comply with the IADC guidelines.138 The U.N.
supported adoption of the code, but the U.S., though initially favoring
adoption, reversed its position in 2012.139 U.N. negotiations on a revised
version of the EU code have begun,140 but may not make much progress.
Chinese resistance is a daunting obstacle, as China has classified the
issue of space debris as a “low priority”, especially given its position that
“the behavior encouraged by the Code of Conduct would seem to run
contrary to current Chinese interests.”141
Binding Treaties are Imprecise, Unclear, and Often
Unenforceable
The Outer Space Treaty is the most important source of space
law.142 Article 9 of that Treaty prescribes that states have an obligation to
avoid “harmful contamination” of space.143 This provision could be
construed to mitigate the effects of space debris. On the other hand,
“harmful contamination” could have several alternate meanings.
Some legal scholars believe that it might refer to harmful
contamination of the Earth, and thus bans bringing back harmful
extraterrestrial material.144 This is unlikely. The passage in question
reads: “States Parties to the Treaty shall . . . conduct exploration of [outer
space, including the moon and other celestial bodies] so as to avoid their
harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of
the Earth resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial
matter . . . .”145 This provision specifically refers to changes in the
Earth’s environment, which would seem to include contamination of the

136. Plantz, supra note 65, at 608.
137. Imburgia, supra note 23, at 625.
138. Kleiman, supra note 9, at 79.
139. Id. at 80.
140. Id.
141. Michael Listner, Code of Conduct: Corrections, Updates, and Thoughts Going
Forward, The Space Rev. (June 18, 2012), www.thespacereview.com/article/2101/1.
142. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19.
143. See id. at art. 9.
144. Imburgia, supra note 23, at 615.
145. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 19, at art. 9.

Earth’s surface. Therefore, unless the reference to “harmful
contamination” is redundant with the ‘Earth’s environment’ clause, it
must mean something different than contamination of the Earth’s surface.
These competing interpretations show how confusing the Outer Space
Treaty can be. At least one legal scholar even suggests that “harmful
contamination” may not include debris at all, and refers only to
astronauts and active spacecraft.146
Article 7 of the Outer Space Treaty states that a State Party
launching a space object “is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the [Outer Space] Treaty or to its natural or juridical
persons by such object or its component parts . . . .”147 The two critical
terms in this Article—”object” and “component parts”—are undefined.148
“Object” could include debris, or could include active spacecraft and
astronauts only. “Component parts” could include debris as well—any
and all fragments of a space object. The treaty uses the word
“component” rather than some clearer descriptor such as “all,” and thus
the term may simply refer to larger sections of spacecraft such as rocket
boosters or fuel tanks.149 Because Article 7 of the Outer Space Treaty
mentions both “objects” and “component parts,” the two terms
presumably have different meanings. Nonetheless, there are no legallybinding authorities on what those meanings might be. There has never
been any “litigation over damage caused by space debris and other
objects in outer space,”150 and consequently there is no relevant case law
to draw upon. The all-important Outer Space Treaty, marked by a distinct
lack of definitive terms, has limited use to the international community in
addressing space debris.
Furthermore, the Outer Space Treaty would actually hinder active
debris removal, should technology ever allow such efforts. Article 8
prescribes that States Parties maintain control over their launched objects
and their component parts forever.151 Hence, states would not be legally
able to remove another state’s debris without asking for specific
permission.152 This would make removal efforts even more costly and
time-consuming, and possibly transform such efforts into another arena
for international politics. A country could, for instance, only allow other
states to remove its space debris if they made certain political
concessions. This provision should at some point be revised, but this is
not an immediate priority, because the international community currently
lacks the technology to remove orbital debris under any legal regime.
The Liability Convention has problems similar to those of the Outer
Space Treaty.153 The Liability Convention defines “space object” to
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include “component parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle
and parts thereof.”154 However, like the Outer Space Treaty, the Liability
Convention fails to define the term “component parts.”155 This means
that a “component part” might only be a major component, such as a
rocket booster, or it could include any small piece of an object which
might break away. A more important problem with the Liability
Convention is its use of the term “fault.”156 The Liability Convention
imposes strict liability on states whose space objects cause damage on the
ground or in the Earth’s atmosphere.157 However, it requires a
determination of fault before assigning liability for damage to other
objects in space.158 The Liability Convention does not define the term
“fault,” but it is understood to mean a breach of a legal duty.159 This
fault-based liability scheme becomes problematic when no specific legal
duties exist. States have no way of knowing when they will be at fault, or
what behaviors they must follow to avoid liability. The codes of conduct
described earlier in this Note do set standards of behavior,160 but none of
them are linked in any legal way to the Liability Convention.
The Liability Convention has proved toothless even in egregious
cases, such as the 2007 Chinese missile test. Despite that test’s
devastating and predictable consequences for the debris population, no
charges have been brought, and no action has been taken. In fact, the
Liability Convention has only been used once.161 A Soviet satellite
crashed in Canada in 1978, and the Canadian government used the
Liability Convention to bring a lawsuit.162 The suit settled a few years
later for three million Canadian dollars.163 The Liability Convention thus
does have some utility, but it has never been used to hold a state
accountable for damage caused to objects in space.
Another issue is that the Liability Convention only applies to
damage dealt directly to people or objects.164 This became relevant in the
case of the above mentioned Soviet satellite crash. Upon impact, the
Soviet satellite did not harm any people or objects—the damage done
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was exclusively to the Canadian landscape.165 The only costs incurred by
the Canadian government were clean-up costs, but these were quite
substantial, amounting to fourteen million Canadian dollars.166 Canada
likely settled for three million Canadian dollars simply because it was
unsure that the Liability Convention would actually hold the Soviet
Union accountable for debris-related damage.167 Debris in orbit can also
indirectly cause injuries or additional expenses, such as “launch delays or
collision-avoidance maneuvers.”168 These are expensive and
inconvenient, but the Liability Convention would not help states recover
damages for these injuries alone.
Lastly, the Liability Convention requires effective surveillance to
function, because a party that sustains damage must know where the
debris that harmed it came from. As discussed above, most debris is too
small to be detected.169 Collisions are often unexpected, almost by
definition. Most spacecraft can move out of the way of a piece of
oncoming debris if the spacecraft’s controlling organization has enough
warning. In the aftermath of a collision, it may be impossible to tell
which piece of debris caused it. Even with that information in hand, the
aggrieved state would then have to find out what country created the
precipitating debris. This is difficult,170 which is why the Liability
Convention may only be effective at assigning blame for collisions
caused by large, easily-monitored debris.
Potentially, the Registration Convention can ensure enforcement of
the Liability Convention, because catalogued debris will facilitate
investigation as to which state’s debris caused what collision.171
Unfortunately, the Registration Convention has its own difficulties. First,
there are no penalties for not registering launches or other space
operations with the UN.172 This may create a perverse disincentive to
registration. It is much harder to hold states accountable for any debris
they create if they do not register their launches and other space
operations. Indeed, most states do not fully comply with the Convention,
and many spacecraft or parts thereof go unregistered.173 States can
request the aid of other states in identifying certain pieces of debris.174
However, in light of the limits of debris monitoring, this is unlikely to be
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of much help.175
Even when states comply with the Registration Convention, it may
not be effective at preventing debris. The Registration Convention
requires registration “as soon as practicable,”176 but never defines when
that is.177 Spacecraft could be in orbit for some time before they are
registered, even if the launching country does eventually comply with the
Registration Convention. Furthermore, the Convention is unclear on
whether or not states need to register anything beyond active
spacecraft.178 States can thus essentially choose how and when they
comply with the Registration Convention, further limiting its
effectiveness.
A Potential Solution: Establish Strict Liability for All Damage
Caused by Space Operations by Modifying the Liability Convention.
As the above Section demonstrates, space debris is a complicated
problem with no quick or easy solutions. No one proposal can solve
everything. As the predictions above show, even stopping all future
spacecraft launches would do little to mitigate the dangers of current
debris, and would not do much to clear the Earth’s orbit, at least not
quickly. The international community must focus on practical, albeit
imperfect, policies that limit debris growth until a way to remove debris
can be found.
Perhaps the simplest solution is to amend the Liability Convention
so that “fault” is no longer required for liability for damage in space.179
States would be strictly liable for all damage their debris causes, whether
that damage happens in orbit or on the ground. This was actually
proposed when the Liability Convention was being drafted, but it was
met with “universal disapproval.”180 This idea was disfavored in the
1990s, because it seemed politically impossible.181 Discussion of such a
solution has abated in the last ten to fifteen years. Given the current
severity of the problem, now is the time to revisit this admittedly harsh
option.
Faultless Strict Liability acts as a Deterrent, Promoting Caution
among States Engaged in Space Operations
Should the treaty be amended to remove the fault requirement, all
participating states will have the motivation to act cautiously in their
handling of space operations. Satellites and spacecraft are expensive, and
so the financial burden of replacing a damaged or destroyed spacecraft
would be very heavy. Debris creation would become a risky activity.
Since debris is impossible to control, states would have to focus on
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minimizing the amount of debris that they create. Unlike current
international law, concrete financial incentives would ensure satellites go
into a declining orbit, and are not simply left in high-traffic orbital lanes.
Participating countries would have to carefully weigh the costs and
benefits of each individual space operation, and may abandon those
launches that create or risk creating substantially more debris.
This would also encourage states to monitor private parties that
come under their sovereign rule. The Liability Convention already holds
countries accountable for the actions of private parties within their
borders. States which host large satellite telecommunications businesses,
such as the United States, would have strong incentives to force those
companies to abide by debris-mitigation guidelines. Companies could
perhaps move their launches to countries with laxer regulations, in what
game theorists have termed a race to the bottom. This is unlikely,
though, because the only states with the infrastructure necessary to
support such launches are large, developed countries, most of which tend
to obey international law.
Strict Liability Encourages Investment in Debris-Monitoring
and Debris-Removal Technologies
Debris monitoring is useful, but extremely limited, and debris
removal is effectively impossible. Strict liability would give countries
several distinct incentives to enhance their debris-monitoring efforts.
First, monitoring their own debris can help countries avoid liability for
collisions. If a country sees that their debris may soon collide with a
spacecraft of another country, the two countries can work together to
avoid that collision—and thus avoid any liability. Because wealthier
countries—such as the United States—are responsible for most of the
existing debris, they will have the most motivation to step up their
monitoring efforts. In this way, the monitoring costs may be borne by
those most able to bear them.
As one commentator has argued, “[a]lthough the current orbital
debris problem is a result of international production, the primary
responsibility must rest squarely on the spacefaring states who launch the
greatest number of objects into space.”182 This liability scheme would
move toward that goal. Certainly, the United States would be less likely
to continue shutting down large debris-monitoring radar arrays in the
name of cost reductions.
A second incentive to develop better monitoring capabilities is that
doing so would enhance a state’s ability to provide evidence when
bringing claims under the Liability Convention. With sufficient
monitoring capabilities, a state would only need to prove that (1) a
damaging collision occurred, and (2) the debris that caused the collision
came from one specific country. Debris monitoring would thus become a
way to defend a state’s investment in a space object. Close monitoring
for liability purposes could mean that proof of a country’s liability, and
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thus its responsibility to cover damages, becomes readily available.
Strict liability creates similar incentives to invest in debris removal.
Given the inexorable increase in the debris population, even without the
launch of new spacecraft, removal is the only long-term way to stabilize
the debris environment. As long as debris collisions produce more debris,
countries’ exposure to liability will increase. The threat of liability may
encourage research on debris removal methods and related technologies.
It is not possible to chart the course of technological advancement today,
and it is equally impossible to guess when a solution to the problem of
debris removal will be available. But the process must begin as soon as
possible. The threat of strict liability could serve to kick-start the required
research.
Perhaps the most powerful argument against strict liability is that it
does not protect against debris that is too small to monitor, or debris of
unknown origin.183 That is a troublesome shortcoming, and doubtless
there will be many collisions caused by unidentified debris. Debris
cascades may worsen this. Imagine, for example, that object A collides
with object B, creating debris which collides with object C, which in turn
breaks up and damages object D. This chain of events could be very
difficult to monitor. However, the incentives described above partially
mitigate this issue—if countries can create better monitoring programs in
order to “defend”‘ their spacecraft, and if the incentives to share data are
sufficiently strong, then monitoring could become much more effective
than it is today.
Strict Liability Minimizes Transaction Costs, Making Debris
Lawsuits More Likely
For this regime to have any force within the international
community, litigation must be a credible threat. With a fault-based
system, disputes could drag on for prolonged periods of time, and
aggrieved states bear a substantial risk of losing on the fault question
itself. These costs could deter litigation. With strict liability, an easily
interpreted legal standard would emerge, and the evidence needed to win
would be objective and fact-based. If the accused state created the
precipitating piece of debris, it is liable. This leaves less room for legal
maneuvering, and facilitates efficient adjudication. Faster judgments are
not always a good thing, but are at least partially justified by the
“abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous character of space
activities.”184 There may be rare cases in which an innocent country is
forced to pay for damages, but the severe consequences of ignoring the
debris problem compensate for this eventuality. Provided they have the
monitoring data, even poorer countries should be able to bring and win a
lawsuit over debris-related damages in space.
The costs of writing the amendment are also worth considering.
Changing a few words in the Liability Convention could be done cheaply
and quickly. Any other solution would likely require creating an entirely
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new regulatory regime. Pursuing other avenues may lead to a very
lengthy negotiation and drafting process, even before debates on
ratification begin. Because space debris must be dealt with immediately,
the speed and ease of a strict liability amendment are major advantages.
Strict Liability is Now More Politically Viable
Twenty years ago, a commentator concluded that “although a strict
liability system theoretically may be a good idea, it is doubtful that it
could generate the acceptance necessary for its implementation.”185
However, the situation is not what it was two decades ago. Since then,
the debris population has massively increased, the Kessler Syndrome has
been reaffirmed, and states and other actors have created debrismitigation guidelines.186 The existence of the NASA and IADC
guidelines, and the continuing negotiations on expanding those
guidelines, show an increasing willingness to make some sacrifices in the
name of regulating debris. None of these existing regimes are as severe
as strict liability, but they reflect an increased awareness of the scope of
the problem. During his 2008 election campaign, then-Senator Obama
even supported “an international approach to minimizing space
debris.”187 With strong leadership from the United States, this
amendment may garner international support.
China and Russia are the amendment’s most likely opposition.
Russia’s Cold War legacy would leave it responsible for a large quantity
of debris, and China would be responsible for the effects of their 2007
missile test. Yet there is some hope of persuading these countries. Most
of the debris currently in orbit is not tracked, and so even if that debris is
located again, there would be no way to determine its country of origin.
Establishing liability for collisions caused by already-existing debris
would, in practice, be almost impossible. This weakens the strict liability
regime, but makes it more palatable for China and Russia. They will be
held accountable for what they do from now on, but likely will not be
held responsible for their past acts. If necessary, the strict liability
amendment could explicitly not be retroactive—strict liability would then
only attach to debris created after ratification.
An Alternate Solution: Define “Fault” as “Not Complying with
the IADC Debris-Mitigation Guidelines.”
As mentioned earlier, the IADC guidelines are very useful—the
problem is that many states ignore them. Amending the Liability
Convention to define “fault” as “not complying with the IADC
guidelines” would force states to abide by them, or risk liability for
damage caused by their debris. This is not a new idea.188 Because such
standards now exist, and have the potential to be effective if enforced,
writing them in as a defined standard of care would be easier than ever
before.
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The arguments in favor of this approach are similar to those in favor
of strict liability. There would still be deterrence, and there would still be
incentive to develop more effective debris monitoring. These effects
would likely be weaker, however, because the odds of losing a liability
dispute under this code of conduct would presumably be lower than
losing such a dispute under a strict liability regime. Transaction costs
would also be higher, and disputes would take longer to resolve, because
determining compliance with the code could require a lengthy legal
debate.
Advantages of a code of conduct over strict liability are obvious.
Countries would be more likely to support it, because they would less
likely to be found liable for damages. Modifying such a code in the
future would be easier and less disruptive than attempting to “modify” a
strict and absolute standard such as strict liability. And a code of conduct
is inherently more flexible in its enforcement, and therefore there should
be fewer instances of false-positives. Strict liability seems overall more
effective at combating debris, but a code of conduct would be superior to
the current regime.
IV. Conclusion
To the casual observer, space debris does not appear to be a pressing
problem. The international community has known of the threat it poses at
least since Donald Kessler’s 1978 paper on the Cascade Effect. However
debris has not thus far caused any major calamities. Unlike in the movie
Gravity, no human lives have yet been lost. Satellites do not fall from the
sky with regularity. But “[i]f the international community waits until the
serious consequences of the space debris cascade manifest themselves, it
will be too late.”189 Orbital debris creates more of itself, and because it
cannot currently be removed from orbit, the problem will only get worse.
Many estimates say it will worsen quickly.
If the international community does not take action now, space may
be largely inaccessible to humankind in as little as a century. The
solutions proposed in this Note are drastic, but drastic solutions are
needed if we expect future generations to enjoy the myriad benefits of
satellites and other spacecraft. No one policy can solve the entire
problem, but countries the world over must start evaluating their options
as soon as possible. One thing is certain: the most damning course of
action the international community could take would be to do nothing.

189. Imburgia, supra note 23, at 634–35.

